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FTAI Infrastructure Inc. (FIP) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$0.01 ComplexityHigh Updated
-$34.70 -$10.80
bear -$34.70 base -$32.00 bull -$10.80 margin of safety $0.01 market price* $2.42
Business condition attached to the margin of safety Evidence that the business earns roughly $300 million or more a year, after maintenance spending and before interest (against roughly minus $65 million to plus $150 million so far), or that the roughly $1.2 billion of preferred stock and the near-term debt are retired on terms that leave common holders a real claim.
FTAI Infrastructure owns and operates transportation and energy infrastructure: short-line and regional railroads (Transtar, which serves two U.S. Steel plants under a 15-year services agreement, and Wheeling & Lake Erie, bought in 2025 for about $1.05 billion), the Jefferson Terminal crude and refined-products terminal at the Port of Beaumont, Texas, the Repauno terminal in Gibbstown, New Jersey, and a 485-megawatt gas-fired power plant at Long Ridge in Hannibal, Ohio (100% owned since February 2025). It is run by an outside manager, Fortress, for a fee of 1.5% of equity. How we measured it. We start from the cash the business actually produces for owners: operating cash flow, less working-capital swings, less stock compensation, less the part of capital spending needed just to keep the assets running. On that basis owner earnings were negative in every year since the 2022 spin-off: about minus $1.82 per share in 2022, minus $1.09 in 2023, minus $1.04 in 2024 and minus $3.05 in 2025. Because lenders are paid separately from shareholders, we then add back the interest paid to see what the business earns before its lenders: minus $1.45, minus $0.23, minus $0.16 and minus $1.15 per share. The 2025 figure includes $67 million paid to settle hedges that came with Long Ridge; excluding it, 2025 was about minus $0.57. Capital spending has been large (about $280 million in 2025) and much of it builds new capacity at Jefferson, Repauno and Long Ridge; we split it into maintenance and growth using the company's own ratio of spending to revenue, and 2025 revenue growth was mostly acquired rather than built. Amortization and other non-cash charges are added back as usual and no earnings level was adjusted for them. What the shares are worth after the lenders. At June 30, 2026 the company owed about $2.79 billion of debt on its continuing operations, plus roughly $1.16 billion of redeemable preferred stock (including a preferred issued by the railroad subsidiary to fund Wheeling and a 9% preferred issued in February 2025) that ranks ahead of common shareholders. A further group of assets and liabilities (assets of $1.66 billion, liabilities of $1.49 billion), which appears to be the Long Ridge power business, was reclassified as held for sale in the first half of 2026; we count it at its net carrying value of about $166 million in the base and bull cases and at nothing in the bear case, because we could not see the sale price. Book equity is already negative: total assets of $5.75 billion less liabilities and preferred leaves common shareholders about $519 million short. The high-rate debt (a $1.35 billion term loan at 9.75% due February 2028, 8.75% notes due 2032, 10% Jefferson bonds) is roughly offset in cost by low-rate tax-exempt bonds, so we made no net adjustment for interest rates. The three cases. Bear (about minus $34.70 per share): the business shows no cash flow before interest beyond what it has demonstrated, so it is worth nothing on our evidence; the Long Ridge sale brings back no value to shareholders; and the preferred stock keeps accruing dividends (about $150 million more). Claims of about $4.1 billion exceed the business by that amount. The July 2026 maturity of the $218 million Jefferson bonds, the $106 million term loan due November 2026 and the $1.35 billion term loan due February 2028 all have to be refinanced at high rates for even this outcome to hold. Base (about minus $32.00): the business earns roughly nothing after maintenance spending and before interest. That is what 2025 shows once the newly bought Wheeling railroad is added and the derivative settlement is excluded, so the business is worth $0 by our test, the held-for-sale group is worth $166 million, and the company owes about $3.95 billion of debt and preferred. Shareholders' claim is about minus $3.8 billion, roughly $32 a share. Bull (about minus $10.80): with Wheeling and the full-year effect of the 2025 acquisitions in place, the first half of 2026 suggests the business could earn around $150 million a year before interest, which we value at $2.5 billion as a level that lasts (6% discount rate, no growth). Adding the $166 million held-for-sale group, that is still about $1.3 billion short of the roughly $3.95 billion owed. What we left out. We gave no credit for growth at Jefferson (Beaumont exclusive right to handle liquid hydrocarbons at the Port), Repauno, the hydrogen conversion of the Long Ridge plant, or further acquisitions, because none of it is contracted or already producing cash. The U.S. Steel agreement and the Wheeling railroad are real assets, but their cash generation so far does not cover the interest on the debt that paid for them. Pro forma results published by the company for 2025 as if Long Ridge and Wheeling had been owned all year still show a net loss of about $402 million. Liquidity. The company's own annual report says its cash and forecast cash flow alone were not enough to repay the $218 million Jefferson bonds due July 1, 2026, and relies on refinancing or a $255 million backstop bridge loan that management considers probable. We could not confirm from the available filings how that maturity was ultimately handled; the June 30, 2026 balance sheet shows $477 million of debt due within a year. What would make this wrong. If the held-for-sale power business sells for far more than its carrying value, or if cash flow before interest rises well above $300 million a year and stays there, common shareholders could have real value. We do not see evidence of either today. Some figures for the first half of 2026 come from the quarterly report's financial data only; the narrative text was not available, so the debt inside the held-for-sale group and the cash interest paid in that period are estimates.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 -$3.05 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(118.008)M (includes $(67.006)M paid to settle derivative liabilities assumed with Long Ridge, left in as it is a real cash cost, not timing); working-capital cash effect=+$25.130M source (AR (9.920), other assets (13.282), AP and accrued +51.745, other liabilities (3.413)); SBC=$11.076M; capex (PP&E)=$280.526M, capex/revenue mean FY2022-25=48.4%, growth capex=48.4% x revenue change $171.023M (largely acquired Long Ridge revenue)=$82.777M so maintenance capex=$197.749M; OE=-118.008-25.130-11.076-197.749=$(351.963)M; diluted shares=115.215M; OE/sh=$(3.055). Cash interest paid=$219.634M (business cash flow before lenders=$(132.329)M, $(1.149)/sh; $(0.567)/sh excluding the derivative settlement). Includes 10 months of Long Ridge (consolidated from Feb 2025); Wheeling railroad controlled only from 26 Dec 2025. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001899883-26-000015.
2024 -$1.04 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(15.278)M; working-capital cash effect=+$14.126M source (AR +2.133, other assets (1.976), AP and accrued +20.970, other liabilities (7.001)); SBC=$8.636M; capex (PP&E)=$79.536M, capex/revenue mean FY2022-25=48.4%, growth capex=48.4% x revenue change $11.025M=$5.336M so maintenance capex=$74.200M; OE=-15.278-14.126-8.636-74.200=$(112.240)M; diluted shares=108.218M; OE/sh=$(1.037). Cash interest paid=$94.396M (business cash flow before lenders=$(17.844)M, $(0.165)/sh). Source: FY2024 10-K accession 0001899883-25-000007; cross-checked to FY2025 10-K accession 0001899883-26-000015.
2023 -$1.09 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$5.513M; working-capital cash effect=+$37.701M source (AR +2.840, other assets +25.183, AP and accrued +8.553, other liabilities +1.125); SBC=$9.199M; capex (PP&E)=$99.022M, capex/revenue mean FY2022-25=48.4%, growth capex=48.4% x revenue change $58.506M=$28.318M so maintenance capex=$70.704M; OE=5.513-37.701-9.199-70.704=$(112.091)M; diluted shares=102.961M; OE/sh=$(1.089). Cash interest paid=$88.411M (business cash flow before lenders=$(23.680)M, $(0.230)/sh). Source: FY2023 10-K accession 0001899883-24-000012; cross-checked to FY2025 10-K accession 0001899883-26-000015.
2022 -$1.82 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(42.690)M; working-capital cash effect (AR, other assets, AP and accrued, other liabilities)=$(8.798)M use, so dWC removal adds back $8.798M; SBC (equity-based comp)=$4.146M; capex (PP&E)=$217.141M, capex/revenue mean FY2022-25=48.4%, growth capex=48.4% x revenue change $141.747M=$68.607M so maintenance capex=$148.534M; OE=-42.690+8.798-4.146-148.534=$(186.572)M; diluted shares=102.747M; OE/sh=$(1.816). Cash interest paid=$38.083M (business cash flow before lenders=$(148.489)M, $(1.445)/sh). Source: FY2022 10-K accession 0001899883-23-000002 and FY2024 10-K accession 0001899883-25-000007 (cash flow statement, 2022 column). Series starts FY2022 (spin-off from FTAI Aviation; earlier years are carve-out periods without SBC detail).

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States only: Midwest (Ohio, Indiana, Michigan), Northeast (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland) and South (Texas including Beaumont, Alabama, West Virginia). Refined products handled at Jefferson Terminal in Beaumont, Texas are shipped onward to export markets, but the company's sales are booked in the United States.
Historical growth strategy

We don't have historical growth strategy information for this company yet.

Chart analysis
This is a short chart: the shares have traded on the Nasdaq only since the August 2022 spin-off from FTAI Aviation, so there is no long base or multi-year trend to read. A chartist would treat a stock like this as one that has not established a durable uptrend, would expect large swings around financing news, acquisitions and quarterly results, and would look for a sustained base and a rising volume pattern before calling any bottom. Heavy debt and negative book equity make such a chart fragile: breaks below prior lows tend to be sharp, and rallies fade without improving cash flow. No price data was used here, so no specific support or resistance levels are stated.
Competitors

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Circle of competence

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