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EPR PROPERTIES (EPR) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$41.42 Updated
$32.86 $70.47
bear $32.86 base $58.25 bull $70.47 margin of safety $41.42 market price* $55.71
Business condition attached to the margin of safety No active signs of financial distress (a bankruptcy filing, disclosed rent deferrals, or a credit downgrade) at Topgolf, AMC, or Regal, which together account for roughly 40% of EPR's revenue.
EPR Properties is a real estate investment trust that owns and leases out "experiential" properties rather than operating them itself. Its portfolio is anchored by movie theatres but has diversified in recent years into golf entertainment (led by Topgolf), ski resorts, water parks, and other out-of-home leisure destinations. Tenants sign long-term leases with built-in annual rent increases and are contractually responsible for maintaining the buildings themselves, which gives EPR a fairly predictable, low-maintenance rental income stream. We measured EPR's underlying cash earning power over the six years from 2020 through 2025, a period that captures both the depths of the pandemic-era theatre shutdowns and the recovery since, rather than relying on any single year. 2020 was an extreme low point (theatres closed, tenants deferred rent), while 2025's headline cash flow, though healthy, coincided with an unusually large wave of new property purchases that temporarily depresses our measure of sustainable per-share earnings. Averaged over this stretch, owner earnings run at roughly $2.62 per share. Our base case values the shares at about $58. We assume rental income grows only modestly at first, since the company has told investors that new investment spending will be limited in the near term because of higher borrowing costs, before settling into growth roughly in line with contractual rent escalators. Beyond our ten-year forecast, we assume growth slows to around 1% a year: escalators in the two-thirds of the portfolio outside movie theatres provide a real if modest floor, while some of the theatre-exposed space (still roughly a third of revenue, concentrated in AMC and Regal) is likely to be re-leased at flat-to-lower rents as those leases mature, given a theatrical audience that remains smaller than before streaming. Our bear case, about $33 a share, assumes real trouble with EPR's largest tenants: one or more of its major theatre operators running into renewed financial distress and rejecting leases or negotiating materially lower rent, at the same time that Topgolf, now EPR's single largest tenant at over 14% of revenue, cools off from its post-pandemic growth. With new investment already slowed, there is little new income to offset the loss, and owner earnings fall by roughly a fifth to a third over the first several years before stabilizing at a lower, largely flat level. Our bull case, near $70 a share, has EPR continuing to successfully diversify away from theatres, borrowing costs easing enough to let it resume buying and developing experiential properties at attractive returns, and none of its major tenants running into trouble, letting rental income compound at roughly 4% a year through the forecast period. Weighing these outcomes and leaning toward caution, the margin-of-safety price is approximately $41. That price assumes no active signs of financial trouble at Topgolf, AMC, or Regal specifically, since those three tenants together represent close to 40% of the company's revenue. What would make this estimate wrong: if theatre attendance keeps eroding and the remaining theatre space can't be re-let to comparably paying tenants, or if Topgolf's growth story falters more than we assume, the bear case could prove too optimistic. Conversely, if the company resumes acquisitions sooner than guided and its shift away from theatres accelerates, results could exceed even our bull case. One accounting note: because EPR's tenants bear responsibility for maintaining the buildings they lease, EPR's own spending is almost entirely new investment rather than upkeep. Our standard method estimates a maintenance-spending charge based on how much of each year's investment spending exceeded what revenue growth alone would call for; in a year like 2025, when EPR made unusually large new purchases, this pushed our owner-earnings figure down even though the company's actual cash flow from operations rose year over year. We don't read that as a real deterioration in the business, and note it here for transparency.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $2.50 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$420,953K. ΔWC=$(21,030)K [net use of cash], so subtracting a negative adds back $21,030K. SBC=$15,329K. Capex = 'Acquisition of and investments in real estate and other assets' $151,749K + 'Additions to properties under development' $89,045K = $240,794K (elevated acquisition year per FY2025 10-K, which also states investment spending is expected to be limited near-term due to elevated cost of capital). Revenue grew modestly ($718,357K vs $698,068K), Δrevenue=$20,289K; growth capex = 24.9% x 20,289 = $5,056K; maintenance capex = 240,794-5,056=$235,738K. OE = 420,953+21,030-15,329-235,738 = $190,916K. Diluted shares=76,495K. OE/sh=$2.50. Reconciliation check: independently rebuilding CFO from net income ($274,936K) + D&A ($169,160K) + SBC ($17,504K total incl. severance component) + other non-cash items (financing cost amortization, deferred tax, credit-loss provision, JV equity loss, gain on sale, etc.) + ΔWC ties to reported CFO within 0.1%, confirming no sign/omission errors. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001045450-26-000007. Note: the year-over-year OE decline from 2024 to 2025 is a mechanical artifact of a one-year spike in acquisition volume outpacing revenue growth (raising the formula's imputed maintenance capex), not a decline in underlying cash rental income (CFO itself rose from $393.1M to $421.0M).
2024 $3.39 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$393,137K. ΔWC=$(26,571)K [net use of cash], so subtracting a negative adds back $26,571K. SBC=$14,066K. Capex = acquisition $45,706K + development $102,265K = $147,971K. Revenue declined ($698,068K vs $705,668K in 2023), so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$147,971K (=total capex). OE = 393,137+26,571-14,066-147,971 = $257,671K. Diluted shares=75,999K. OE/sh=$3.39. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001045450-26-000007 (cross-checked vs FY2024 10-K, accession 0001045450-25-000051).
2023 $3.80 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$447,094K. ΔWC=$1,932K. SBC=$17,512K. Capex = acquisition $60,703K + development $91,153K = $151,856K. Revenue grew ($705,668K vs $658,031K), Δrevenue=$47,637K; growth capex = 24.9% x 47,637 = $11,872K; maintenance capex = 151,856-11,872=$139,984K. OE = 447,094-1,932-17,512-139,984 = $287,666K. Diluted shares=75,715K. OE/sh=$3.80. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001045450-26-000007 (cross-checked vs FY2024 10-K, accession 0001045450-25-000051).
2022 $2.25 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$441,716K. ΔWC=$37,272K (net source of cash). SBC=$16,666K. Capex = acquisition $174,533K + development $75,710K = $250,243K. Revenue grew ($658,031K vs $531,680K), Δrevenue=$126,351K; growth capex = 24.9% x 126,351 = $31,486K; maintenance capex = 250,243-31,486=$218,757K. OE = 441,716-37,272-16,666-218,757 = $169,021K. Diluted shares=75,043K. OE/sh=$2.25. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001045450-23-000033.
2021 $2.75 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$306,925K. ΔWC=$30,088K (net source of cash from working capital). SBC=$14,903K. Capex = acquisition $56,556K + development $29,304K = $85,860K. Revenue grew ($531,680K vs $414,661K), Δrevenue=$117,019K; growth capex = capex_ratio(24.9%) x 117,019 = $29,161K; maintenance capex = 85,860-29,161=$56,699K. OE = 306,925-30,088-14,903-56,699 = $205,235K. Diluted shares=74,756K. OE/sh=$2.75. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001045450-23-000033.
2020 $0.75 ▼
OE = CFO - ΔWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$65,273K. ΔWC (change in assets/liabilities per CFS, 2020)= $(84,636)K [net use of cash, mainly AR +$47,383K use from COVID rent deferrals], so subtracting a negative adds back $84,636K. SBC=$13,819K. Capex = 'Acquisition of and investments in real estate and other assets' $38,714K + 'Additions to properties under development' $40,470K = $79,184K. Revenue declined ($414,661K vs $651,969K in 2019), so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$79,184K (=total capex). OE = 65,273+84,636-13,819-79,184 = $56,906K. Diluted shares=75,994K. OE/sh=$0.75. Capex_ratio (mean capex/revenue, 2020-2025 window)=24.9%, used for growth-capex allocation in other years. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001045450-21-000020 (cross-checked vs FY2022 10-K, accession 0001045450-23-000033). COVID-19 trough year (theatre closures/rent deferrals); included as the cyclical low point of the anchor window.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

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