$4.50
$29.70
bear $4.50
base $17.80
bull $29.70
margin of safety $11.50
market price* $33.20
Business condition attached to the margin of safety
The new floating regasification terminal for Iraq is in commercial service and billing under the signed five-year agreement (the base case counts about $35M a year from it). The margin-of-safety price applies once that is true.
Excelerate Energy owns and operates floating LNG regasification terminals (FSRUs), ships that turn liquefied natural gas back into pipeline gas for countries without their own import terminals. Customers such as Bangladesh's state gas company, Argentina, Brazil, Finland, Germany, Pakistan and the UAE pay long-term charter and service fees under take-or-pay contracts; the customer generally bears the vessel's operating costs. Since May 2025 it also owns New Fortress Energy's Jamaica business (Montego Bay and Old Harbour LNG terminals and the Clarendon power plant), bought for about $1.03 billion in cash, and it sells LNG and gas under back-to-back contracts, including a 15-year supply deal with Petrobangla. A new vessel, built for a five-year regasification and LNG supply agreement with Iraq's Ministry of Electricity, was due for delivery in the second quarter of 2026, with service starting in the third quarter. The company is structured so that a large block of ownership units (about 82 million) is held outside the public Class A shares (about 32 million); we value all roughly 115 million shares-equivalent together so every share bears the same claim. HOW WE MEASURED EARNINGS. We start from operating cash flow, remove working-capital swings, and deduct stock compensation and the capital spending needed just to maintain the fleet. That gives owner earnings of about $1.74 per share in 2024 and $1.92 in 2025 (2023 was negative because of the one-time $265 million purchase of the Sequoia vessel, previously leased; 2022 was distorted by LNG resale and working-capital swings). Because the company now carries about $1.1 billion of borrowings, we then add back cash interest to see what the business itself earns before its lenders (about $296 million in 2025, or roughly $282 million after removing interest earned on cash we count separately), value that, and subtract the debt. The 2025 figure includes only about eight months of Jamaica and $34 million of one-time acquisition costs. First-half 2026 cash flow, which we used only as a cross-check, ran at a similar or somewhat higher pace. Growth check: business cash flow per share grew about 15% in 2025 and owner earnings per share about 10%; the base case assumes about 10% per share in 2026, resting on two named items only: four extra months of Jamaica (the filing shows Jamaica added about $70 million of adjusted EBITDA in its first eight months) and the signed Iraq contract. WHAT EACH CASE ASSUMES. All three use a 6% discount rate and credit only contracted or already-paid-for cash flow.
Base case: the existing terminal fleet earns about $220 million a year (after tax, maintenance and stock compensation, before lenders) through 2035, supported by a track record of extending contracts (the filing says many older contracts have already been extended and all owned vessels are contracted), then fades to zero by 2045 as the 2005-2009 vintage ships age. Jamaica contributes about $80 million a year through 2039, the length of its long-term customer contracts, then nothing. The Iraq vessel adds about $35 million a year from 2027 (half in 2026), estimated from the fleet average of roughly $57 million of contracted terminal revenue per vessel; the Iraq contract's pricing is not disclosed, so this is our estimate. The business is worth about $27.5 per share; it owes about $9.7 per share (about $1.1 billion after cash, finance leases, outside partners' share of the Bangladesh and Albania entities, and about $50 million for the 8% notes costing more than 6%), leaving about $17.8 per share.
Bear case: the fleet earns about $200 million a year until 2028 and then declines to zero by 2036 because the terminal contracts average only 5.8 years of remaining life, the Bangladesh Excellence contract ends in 2033, two or three customers account for most revenue, and the vessels are old; Jamaica earns about $65 million; the Iraq vessel earns nothing until 2028 and then about $20 million. We also assume the $800 million of 8% notes due May 2030 is refinanced at about 10%. The business is worth about $15.1 per share, it owes about $10.6, leaving about $4.5 per share. Cash flow stays well above the roughly $100 million annual interest bill for the years that matter.
Bull case: contracts are extended and the fleet holds about $240 million a year through 2040 before fading by 2055; Jamaica holds about $85 million through 2044; Iraq's customer uses its option to raise volume toward 500 MMscf/d and the vessel earns about $55 million. The business is worth about $39.4 per share, owes about $9.7, leaving about $29.7. WHAT WE LEFT OUT. New terminals or projects not yet signed, trading margins on LNG resales, the Petrobangla LNG contract (priced back-to-back so margin is small), share gains and higher charter rates beyond what is already contracted, because none are contracted or a repeated pattern we can rely on. WHAT COULD MAKE THIS WRONG. Customer concentration in a few government-backed buyers (Bangladesh, Iraq, Jamaica) with political and payment risk; Iraq is the country's first LNG import terminal; contract renewals on 15-20-year-old ships; the $800 million balloon in 2030; and the estimates for Iraq and Jamaica after-tax cash, which the filings do not break out. We could not reconcile the company's own adjusted EBITDA to our owner earnings and rely only on our own figures.