$16.01
$29.46
bear $16.01
base $27.17
bull $29.46
margin of safety $11.50
market price* $13.30
Dole plc is one of the world's largest fresh-produce companies, formed in 2021 when Ireland's Total Produce combined with Dole Food. It runs three businesses. Fresh Fruit grows or buys bananas, pineapples and plantains, mainly in Latin America, and ships them on its own vessels to North America and Europe. Diversified Fresh Produce EMEA (about $4.0 billion of 2025 revenue) is a produce distribution network strongest in Spain, the U.K., the Netherlands, Scandinavia and the Czech Republic, with an export business in South Africa. Diversified Fresh Produce Americas & Rest of World brought in about $1.7 billion. Revenue from continuing operations was $9.17 billion in 2025. This is a very high-volume, thin-margin business, earning roughly two to three cents of cash per dollar of sales, so small changes in fruit, fuel, shipping and labor costs move profit a lot. Dole sold Progressive Produce in March 2024 and its Fresh Vegetables division in August 2025. We measure only the business that remains, using the three years (2023-2025) that the latest annual report restates on that basis. How we measured earnings. We start from operating cash flow, remove swings in receivables, inventory and payables, subtract stock compensation as a real cost, and subtract the capital spending needed to keep the business running. On that basis owner earnings were about $150 million in 2023, $136 million in 2024 and $167 million in 2025 ($1.57, $1.42 and $1.75 per share, before the share that belongs to minority partners). Three judgments matter. First, reported 2025 operating cash flow fell to $123 million from $263 million. That was working capital: receivables rose $125 million on higher sales, larger grower advances and less selling of receivables, and inventory rose $68 million. We treat this as timing, not lost earning power, and the first half of 2026 supports that: operating cash flow was about $52 million better than in the same period of 2025. Second, 2025 capital spending of $121 million included $36 million to buy out two finance leases. That is repaying debt, so we exclude it. Third, reported profit is much lower than these cash earnings, and the return on book equity is only about 7%. That is mainly because depreciation and amortization (about $113 million a year, including amortization of intangibles and revalued assets from the 2021 merger) runs well above the roughly $79 million Dole has actually spent each year to maintain the business. More than half of book equity is goodwill and intangibles from that merger; on tangible equity the 2025 return was about 16%. Because we value the business before its lenders, we add back cash interest ($82 million, $67 million and $64 million). That gives pre-interest cash earnings of $2.44, $2.13 and $2.41 per share for 2023-2025. We center on $2.35 per share, just under the median, because 2024 shows the level can dip. What changed since our last look. On July 1, 2026 Dole completed the sale of its port in Ecuador. After buying out the port's minority partner in May, net proceeds are about $95 million, roughly $1 per share, and management says the port contributed little to ongoing earnings. We now credit the $50 million note Dole received from the buyer of the vegetables business. It pays 5% a year in added principal and is due December 2030, and Dole booked it (with a $10 million earn-out) at $40 million. We now deduct $3.8 million of earn-outs Dole owes on past acquisitions. We also now count the extra money Dole borrows every first half to build inventory, not just its lower year-end debt. The first half of 2026 was weaker than we previously allowed for. Continuing profit fell about 15% from the year before in the first quarter and about 34% in the second, even though revenue rose 7%. Part of the second-quarter drop does not reflect lasting earning power: the prior year included gains on land sales in Hawaii, and this year included a one-time legal settlement. The rest is real. The conflict in the Middle East pushed up fuel and shipping costs, and South African exports to the region were disrupted. Pineapple supply was hurt by weather, and a stronger Costa Rican colon raised growing costs. Gross profit fell $23 million in the quarter. We lowered the first year of the base case to reflect this. Finally, we removed the steady growth from our best case. Dole's cash earnings have not grown in dollars since 2023 even though revenue rose 11%, so higher fruit prices have not reliably turned into higher earnings. Base case ($27.17 per share). In 2025, pre-interest cash earnings grew 13%. We assume 2026 comes in at about $2.15 per share, an 11% drop. Dole's shipping contracts pass fuel costs through to customers a quarter late, so part of the second-quarter hit should come back in the second half, but not all of it. Earnings then return to $2.35 per share, a level the business has already earned on its current shape, and hold flat in dollars from then on. No growth is credited. In 2026 Dole bought Greenfood's fresh-produce business in Sweden and Finland (about $250 million of revenue, price not disclosed) and a small Irish growing business, and it plans automation investment in Scandinavia. We treat these as paid at fair value and credit no growth from them until they show results. What keeps the earnings going is already in place: the Dole brand, owned farms and ships, and a distribution network serving supermarkets across Europe and North America. The business is worth about $3.73 billion. It owes about $704 million. That is $874 million of year-end borrowings including finance leases and overdrafts, less cash above an estimated $100 million needed to run the business, less the $95 million from the port sale, plus $15 million spent on share buybacks in 2026, $4 million of acquisition earn-outs, and about $74 million for the extra it borrows every first half to build inventory (net debt was $746 million at June 30, 2026 against about $600 million at the end of 2025). Outside partners own stakes in several subsidiaries. Over 2023-2025 they took about 12.5% of the group's cash earnings in dividends and profit share, a claim worth about $466 million. The vegetables sale note adds about $40 million. That leaves about $2.60 billion for shareholders. Worst case ($16.01 per share). The first-half decline holds for the full year, taking cash earnings to about $1.88 per share. Fruit-sourcing, fuel and shipping costs then keep squeezing margins by about 2.5% a year for a decade, and earnings settle at about $1.50 per share. These pressures are named and already visible. Higher sourcing costs, Tropical Storm Sara's damage in Honduras and vessel disruptions hurt 2025. The Middle East conflict raised fuel and shipping costs in 2026. A strong El Nino is now building, which typically brings heavy rain to Ecuador and northern Peru and drought to Central America and Colombia, where Dole grows and buys much of its fruit. Tropical Race 4, a banana disease with no proven cure, is already present in some areas where Dole sources, though it has not yet materially hit its operations. Upkeep may also cost more than we deduct: management plans about $100 million of routine capital spending for 2026 against the roughly $79 million a year Dole has actually spent, and if $100 million is the true cost, cash earnings are about $0.20 a share lower every year. We also value the vegetables note at only $20 million, because the business it came from lost money in each of its last three years under Dole. The business is worth about $2.53 billion. It owes about $704 million, and the partner claim is about $317 million, leaving about $1.53 billion. Even in this case cash earnings cover the interest bill more than twice, so the debt can be carried. Best case ($29.46 per share). Fuel surcharges and the recovery of Dole's Honduran farms after Tropical Storm Sara bring this year in near $2.30 per share. Earnings then settle at about $2.50 per share. That is 2025's level plus part of an unusually high 2025 tax bill: Dole paid $100 million in cash taxes against $78 million in 2024, partly from one-time taxes on the vegetables sale and on bringing cash home from abroad. The U.S. also lifted tariffs on bananas and other tropical fruit in November 2025, which removes a 2025 cost. We credit no growth beyond that, for the reasons above. The business is worth about $3.97 billion. After about $704 million of debt and a $496 million partner claim, plus $50 million for the vegetables note at full value, about $2.82 billion remains. Debt and other obligations. In May 2025 Dole refinanced its bank debt into three pieces: a $600 million revolving credit line and a $250 million term loan, both maturing May 2030, and a $350 million Farm Credit term loan maturing May 2032. The rates float, with part fixed through interest-rate swaps. The cost was around 6-7% in 2025 and nearer 6% in 2026, so we make no adjustment for it. Ship loans of about $45 million were repaid early in 2026. Because Dole borrows more every first half to build inventory and pays that interest every year, we count debt at its average level through the year rather than its year-end low. Dole sells about $247 million of receivables to banks, $223 million of them with recourse. We do not add these to debt because their cost is already deducted in the earnings we value. If the banks withdrew these facilities, Dole would have to fund the receivables from its credit line. Some partners can require Dole to buy their stakes, at a combined value of about $40 million at year-end 2025, payable over up to four years. That is already inside the partner claim above. Uncertainties. We could only reconcile three years on the current business, which is short for a crop- and weather-exposed company. 2022, a poor year for the industry, cannot be measured on the same basis, so if years like it recur regularly, our $2.35 level may be too high. Whether upkeep really costs about $79 million or closer to $100 million a year will show in the 2026 year-end cash flow; at $100 million, the base case would be about $24 per share. The price paid for the Greenfood business and the amount of the legal settlement have not been disclosed. We rely on management's statement that the Ecuador port contributed little to earnings, which the annual report does not let us check. Part of 2025's higher tax payments looks one-time, but the filings do not give the amount, so only the best case gives any credit for it. The partners' stakes are valued from what they have actually received, not from a disclosed market value.