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Ginkgo Bioworks Holdings, Inc. (DNA) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$0.00 ComplexityHigh Updated
-$5.09 $0.70
bear -$5.09 base -$3.03 bull $0.70 margin of safety $0.00 market price* $10.27
Ginkgo Bioworks sells biological research and development. Its Cell Engineering segment ($132.7 million of 2025 revenue) performs engineering programs for customers, sells lab data generation (Datapoints) and automation built on its Reconfigurable Automation Cart (RAC) systems. Its Biosecurity segment ($37.4 million) sells biomonitoring and bioinformatics services, including its Canopy and Horizon offerings, to government and non-government customers. Revenue has fallen from $477.7 million in 2022 (when it still included COVID-19 test kits) to $251.5 million in 2023, $227.0 million in 2024 and $170.2 million in 2025. Both segments lost money in 2025, Cell Engineering $95.5 million and Biosecurity $18.9 million, before stock pay, depreciation and restructuring. Owner earnings. We measure the cash the business produces for its owners: operating cash flow, with working-capital swings removed, stock-based pay charged as a real cost, and capital spending needed to keep the business running deducted. We kept lease rent inside these figures as an ongoing cost. On that basis Ginkgo has not had a single positive year in the seven years its filings cover (2019 to 2025). Owner earnings were about -$396 million in 2024 (-$7.64 per share) and -$240 million in 2025 (-$4.33 per share). The improvement came from deep cost cuts: Cell Engineering research spending fell from $271.5 million to $158.5 million and its administrative costs from $115.0 million to $56.5 million. 2021 and 2022 are not representative because stock-based pay was $1.6 billion and $1.9 billion in those years. We treat 2024 as part of the restructuring and anchor on the business as it now runs: 2025, checked against the first half of 2026. In the first half of 2026, operating cash flow was -$91.0 million, similar to -$91.8 million a year earlier, in a half-year in which Ginkgo was required to make a one-time $14.0 million payment in January 2026 to be released from the original minimum-spending terms of its Google Cloud contract. Stock pay fell to $23.4 million from $36.2 million. That points to a loss rate of roughly $210 million a year. Note that 2025 revenue included $11.6 million paid in customers' equity rather than cash, as well as deferred revenue released when customer contracts ended. Neither brings in new cash. Is growth credited? No. Losses narrowed by 39% in 2025. Our middle case assumes only a further 13% narrowing in the first year, based on the first-half 2026 figures. The annual report gives no dated path to profitability. Management states it expects spending to exceed revenue for at least the next 12 months. A return to profit would be a turnaround, and we do not credit a turnaround until it shows up in the cash. We give no value to possible future royalties, milestone payments or equity stakes from customer programs, because the filings do not show them as secured cash. Acquired intangible assets ($56.9 million) wear out over time, but because no growth is assumed their decline does not lift the value. Balance sheet. Ginkgo has no borrowings. At June 30, 2026 it held $84.5 million of cash and $217.6 million of marketable securities. We also count $15.1 million of equity investments (year-end 2025 value), for about $317 million in total. We exclude $87.5 million of restricted cash, which mainly backs letters of credit on its facility leases and customer prepayments. Those leases are its largest obligation: $56.3 million of minimum rent due in 2026 and $606.5 million after that, with its significant leases expiring between 2030 and 2039. They are charged inside the cash flows above, not subtracted again. The Google Cloud contract, as amended in October 2025, still commits Ginkgo to $110 million of purchases over six years. Ginkgo has been paying for its losses by selling shares under a $100 million at-the-market program with Allen & Company started in September 2025: $18.1 million raised in 2025 and a further $17.0 million from share issuance in the first half of 2026. Shares outstanding rose from 54.4 million at the end of 2024 to 63.7 million at June 30, 2026. Cases, discounted at 6%: Bear: losses stay at the 2025 level of about $240 million a year for three years, paid for from cash and further share sales, and then the business stops with nothing left over. The operations are worth about -$642 million. With no debt and $317 million of liquid assets, equity is worth about -$324 million, or -$5.09 per share. In other words, the business would consume about $324 million more than the company holds. A wind-down would also leave the remaining lease commitments to settle, which could make this worse. Base: losses run at about $210 million in the first year (the first-half 2026 rate without the one-time Google payment), then $190 million and $170 million as lower stock pay and capital spending continue, and then stop. Operations are worth about -$510 million. After the $317 million of liquid assets, equity is worth about -$193 million, or -$3.03 per share. Bull: the cost program keeps working and losses narrow to $150 million, $100 million and $50 million over three years, reaching breakeven in the fourth year. We give nothing for profits after that because none has been shown. Operations are worth about -$272 million. Equity is worth about +$45 million, or $0.70 per share. What the shares appear to be worth. In the middle case the cash on hand does not cover the losses still to come, so existing shareholders' stake keeps shrinking as new shares are sold to fund it. Even the optimistic case is worth less than $1 per share. For this to be wrong, Ginkgo would need to show sustained positive cash generation, which it has not done in any year on record. The customer concentration adds risk: in 2025 one Cell Engineering customer was 15% of revenue and one Biosecurity customer 12%. Share figures reflect the 1-for-40 reverse split of August 19, 2024. Margin-of-safety price. Because the middle case is below zero, no price is justified by the business as it stands, and the margin-of-safety price is $0.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 -$4.33 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(171.059)M; dWC=$(19.970)M (cash-flow working-capital changes of $(44.088)M excluding operating lease ROU/liability lines of $(24.118)M, which are kept in OE as the cash cost of rent); SBC=$81.546M; capex=$7.665M, growth capex=$0 (revenue declined 170.155 vs 227.043) so maintenance capex=$7.665M; OE=$(240.300)M; diluted shares=55.458M; OE/sh=$(4.33). Reconciles: NI $(312.8)M + non-cash $185.8M - SBC - lease net - capex = $(240.3)M. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-012346.
2024 -$7.63 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(319.585)M; dWC=$(98.252)M (cash-flow working-capital changes of $(89.670)M excluding operating lease ROU/liability lines of +$8.582M, kept in OE as the cash cost of rent); SBC=$112.344M; capex=$62.541M, growth capex=$0 (revenue declined 227.043 vs 251.455) so maintenance capex=$62.541M; OE=$(396.218)M; diluted shares=51.895M (post 1:40 reverse split); OE/sh=$(7.64). Reconciles: NI $(547.0)M + non-cash $317.1M - SBC - lease net - capex = $(396.2)M. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-012346.
2023 -$12.54 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(295.500)M; dWC=+$43.362M (cash-flow working-capital changes of +$29.837M excluding operating lease ROU/liability lines of $(13.525)M, kept in OE as the cash cost of rent); SBC=$229.884M; capex=$40.801M, growth capex=$0 (revenue declined 251.455 vs 477.706) so maintenance capex=$40.801M; OE=$(609.547)M; diluted shares=48.611M (restated for 1:40 reverse split); OE/sh=$(12.54). Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-012346.
2022 -$51.20 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(252.198)M; dWC=$(39.447)M (cash-flow working-capital changes of $(37.006)M excluding operating lease ROU +$13.233M and lease liability $(10.792)M, kept in OE as the cash cost of rent); SBC=$1,930.641M (inflated by post-merger RSU/earnout vesting); capex=$52.271M, capex/revenue mean 2019-2025=0.2767, growth capex=0.2767x(477.706-313.837)=$45.34M, maintenance capex=$6.93M; OE=$(2,150.327)M; diluted shares=41.996M (restated for 1:40 reverse split, per FY2024 10-K); OE/sh=$(51.20). Source: FY2022 10-K accession 0000950170-23-007461; shares FY2024 10-K 0001628280-25-007819.
2021 -$52.70 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(253.818)M; dWC=$(67.569)M (cash-flow working-capital changes of $(61.537)M excluding deferred rent +$6.032M, kept in OE as the cash cost of rent); SBC=$1,606.020M (inflated by vesting at the 2021 SPAC merger); capex=$56.521M, growth capex=0.2767x(313.837-76.657)=$65.62M exceeds capex so maintenance capex=$0 (clamped); OE=$(1,792.269)M; diluted shares=1,360.373M/40=34.009M (adjusted for 1:40 reverse split of Aug 2024); OE/sh=$(52.70). Source: FY2022 10-K accession 0000950170-23-007461.
2020 -$5.03 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(135.830)M; dWC=$(27.560)M (cash-flow working-capital changes of $(26.515)M excluding deferred rent +$1.045M, kept in OE as the cash cost of rent); SBC=$0.476M; capex=$57.821M, growth capex=0.2767x(76.657-54.184)=$6.22M, maintenance capex=$51.60M; OE=$(160.350)M; diluted shares=1,274.767M/40=31.869M (adjusted for 1:40 reverse split); OE/sh=$(5.03). Source: FY2021 10-K accession 0000950170-22-004821 and FY2022 10-K 0000950170-23-007461.
2019 -$2.41 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(44.663)M; dWC=+$1.482M (cash-flow working-capital changes of +$10.577M excluding deferred rent +$9.095M, kept in OE as the cash cost of rent); SBC=$0.771M; capex=$22.219M, 2018 revenue not in available filings so growth capex taken as $0 and maintenance capex=$22.219M; OE=$(69.135)M; diluted shares=1,149.000M/40=28.725M (adjusted for 1:40 reverse split); OE/sh=$(2.41). Source: FY2021 10-K accession 0000950170-22-004821.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States (76% of 2025 revenue, 81% in 2024); the remainder international, including biosecurity services sold to foreign government agencies in certain developing countries.
Historical growth strategy

We don't have historical growth strategy information for this company yet.

Chart analysis
The shares closed at $10.66 on September 25, 2026, inside a wide 52-week range of $5.37 to $17.58. A chartist would point to a sharp, high-volatility rebound in September: from about $6.75 on September 11 to above $10 by September 24, including a single-day jump of roughly 19% that day. Before that, the stock spent July and August mostly below $9. The rally is short and still well below the 52-week high, so a chartist would want the price to hold above the $10 area and build a base before calling a change in trend. Earlier price history reflects a 1-for-40 reverse split in August 2024.
Competitors

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Circle of competence

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