-$1.78
$6.71
bear -$1.78
base $0.66
bull $6.71
margin of safety $0.30
market price* $11.77
DigitalBridge manages private funds that invest in digital infrastructure. It earns management fees on the capital investors commit to those funds, a share of investment profits (carried interest) when investments are sold at a gain, and returns on its own money invested alongside its funds. Fee-earning capital under management was $41.0 billion at the end of 2025, up 15% from $35.5 billion a year earlier, helped by the final close of its third flagship fund, DigitalBridge Partners III, at $7.2 billion of commitments on October 31, 2025. Fee revenue was $374.4 million in 2025, $329.7 million in 2024 and $264.1 million in 2023. An important fact for any reader: on December 29, 2025 the company agreed to be acquired by SoftBank Group for $16.00 per common share in cash. Stockholders approved the deal in April 2026, and the company announced in September 2026 that all required regulatory approvals had been received. The company's preferred stock stays outstanding after the deal. The merger agreement includes termination fees of $96 million payable by the company and $154 million payable by SoftBank in limited circumstances. Our figures below value the business on its own earning power and do not assume the deal price; they are far below $16.00, and the reasons are explained further down. How we measured earnings. We start from cash generated by operations, remove the swings from working capital, and subtract stock compensation and capital spending. On that basis the business earned about $52.8 million in 2024 ($0.31 per share) and $147.6 million in 2025 ($0.84 per share). Results before 2023 are not comparable because a much larger asset-owning business was later reclassified as discontinued operations, so we measure only from the current asset-management business, and 2023 is excluded because its cash flow is dominated by that discontinued business. With only two comparable years, we used their middle, about $100.2 million a year, as the normal level. The 2025 figure is flattered by $24.6 million of one-time "catch-up" fees charged retroactively as new investors joined the third flagship fund, and by realized investment income that will not necessarily repeat. Earnings rose about 179% from 2024 to 2025, but we assume no growth in the first year of the base case, well below that trailing rate, because the catch-up fees do not recur and a change in the fee basis on the InfraBridge funds already cut fees by $17.6 million in 2025. Cash earnings are almost entirely management fees. Only $2.5 million of carried interest was actually paid out in 2025, while accrued carried interest was reversed by $378.6 million (a non-cash accounting reversal that lowers reported revenue to $94.0 million but does not affect our cash-based earnings). We give no value to carried interest that has not been paid. A claim ahead of common shareholders. The company has preferred stock with an $821.9 million liquidation preference that pays about $58.6 million a year in dividends and stays outstanding after the SoftBank deal. Because those dividends are not deducted in operating cash flow, we subtract the $821.9 million from the value of the business before dividing by the 183.0 million common shares outstanding in February 2026. The company also has $298.8 million of debt, but its interest is already paid out of operating cash flow, so it is not subtracted again. We did not adjust for outstanding units in the operating partnership or warrants, which would spread the value over somewhat more shares. Base case ($0.66 per share). Earnings stay at about $100.2 million a year for ten years, then fade in equal steps to zero over the following ten years. We credit no growth: fees are largely based on capital already committed to existing funds, but new fundraising has not yet happened and is not counted. The fade reflects that fees from a fund decline as it matures, and no signed successor fund exists to replace them. The value of the business is about $942 million, less the $822 million preferred claim, or about $120 million for common shareholders. Bear case (negative $1.78 per share). Earnings fall back to the 2024 level of about $52.8 million a year, driven by catch-up fees not repeating, further fee-basis reductions like the InfraBridge change, and fund exits reducing fee-paying capital ($2.1 billion of outflows in 2025). Earnings fade after ten years as in the base case. The company also disclosed a hypothetical clawback obligation of $25.0 million on carried interest if funds were liquidated at year-end 2025 values. In this case the business is worth about $497 million against the $822 million preferred claim, so the company appears to owe more than it is worth, by roughly $325 million, and the common shares would have no value. Bull case ($6.71 per share). Earnings hold at about $123.0 million a year (the 2025 level excluding the one-time catch-up fees), and the firm keeps raising successor funds, as the closing of its third flagship fund shows it has done before, so that level continues indefinitely after year ten. Value is about $2,050 million, less the $822 million preferred claim, or about $1,228 million for common shareholders. We give no credit for further growth in fee-earning capital, because it depends on new fundraising that has not yet happened. Why the cases sit far below the agreed deal price. The company carried $2.27 billion of investments on its balance sheet at the end of 2025 (some of the related funds are consolidated, and part of their value belongs to outside fund partners rather than DigitalBridge shareholders). It put $395.9 million into new investments in 2025. We count the cash these holdings produce, but not the unrealized increase in their reported value or accrued carried interest, because neither is cash today. If those investments are worth close to their reported values, our cases would understate the shares; if they are not, the deal price is well above what the business earns. Margin-of-safety price. Given the preferred stock ranking ahead of common shares, the negative bear case, and earnings that depend on fundraising cycles, a large margin of safety is required, and the margin-of-safety price is about $0.30 per share. The $16.00 cash offer is far above our valuation range; it reflects an acquirer's judgment rather than the earnings we measured, and this analysis does not assume it. What would make this wrong: proof that the investments and accrued carried interest convert to cash near their reported values, evidence that successor funds are raised on the same terms, or a completed deal at $16.00.