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Carter Bankshares, Inc. (CARE) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$15.50 ComplexityAverage Updated
$13.85 $38.50
bear $13.85 base $25.15 bull $38.50 margin of safety $15.50 market price* $30.21
Carter Bankshares owns Carter Bank, a community bank with 64 branches (51 in Virginia, 13 in North Carolina), about $4.8 billion of assets, $4.2 billion of deposits and $3.7 billion of loans. It earns the spread between what it charges borrowers, mostly commercial real estate and business borrowers, and what it pays depositors, plus modest fee income. Historically it has been a low-return bank: its equity of about $539 million has usually earned 5-7% a year. The big event: for years the bank's largest exposure was about $300 million of loans to businesses owned by former West Virginia Governor Jim Justice and his family. These loans stopped paying interest in mid-2023, which held down earnings in 2023-2025. On March 26, 2026 the bank sold the remaining $209.5 million of these loans for $289.5 million in cash, booking an $80 million gain and releasing $18 million of reserves. In May 2026 it also sold its stake in Bearing Insurance Group for a $35.9 million gain, and in the second quarter it sold $139 million of low-yielding bonds at a $12.5 million loss to reinvest at about 5.3%. We treat all three as one-time items. None of them is part of our earnings base, and the record first-half 2026 profit of $113 million says nothing about normal earning power. How we measured earnings: we started from cash generated by operations for 2019-2025. We removed timing swings in working capital and in loans made for resale, subtracted stock compensation and the capital spending needed to maintain the branches. That gives cash earnings per share of $1.30 (2019), $1.00 (2020), $1.35 (2021), $2.51 (2022), $1.58 (2023), $1.09 (2024) and $1.38 (2025). The 2020 accounting loss came from a $62 million non-cash goodwill write-off, which does not affect cash earnings. This measure adds back loan-loss provisions, but loan losses are a real, recurring cost for a bank, so every case below subtracts a normal credit-loss charge explicitly. The 2019-2025 window covers a full interest-rate cycle, from near-zero rates to 5%+. Its middle value is about $1.35 a share. Recalculated as if the Justice money had kept earning a normal return in 2023-2025, and with the extra cash from the sale's gain now earning interest, the through-cycle level is about $1.58 a share before credit losses. That money is not a forecast. It is already in hand: the bank used the proceeds to pay its Federal Home Loan Bank borrowings down from $178.5 million to zero by June 30, 2026. The insurance-stake sale is roughly neutral, because the $55.7 million of proceeds replaces the $2-4 million a year the stake used to contribute. Base case ($25.15 a share): cash earnings of $1.58 less a normal credit cost of about 0.15% of loans ($0.20 a share), or $1.38 a share, held flat indefinitely. What keeps it going is the existing branch and deposit franchise, which has kept deposits between $3.7 and $4.2 billion since 2020. We credit no growth. Deposits were flat from 2020 to 2023 and then grew mainly by paying up for CDs and buying two branches in 2025, which is not a proven, self-funded growth engine. For comparison, cash earnings rose 26% in 2025. Our first-year figure is about 15% above 2025 before credit costs and roughly flat after them, so it is below that trailing rate. Discounted at 6%, this is worth about $23.00 a share. We add about $2.15 for capital above what a conservatively run bank this size needs (common equity tier 1 of about 14.3% of risk-weighted assets). That covers only the difference between paying the capital out and leaving it on deposit earning interest. Bear case ($13.85): earnings fall back toward the low end of the rate cycle (about $1.30 before credit costs). Commercial real estate losses run at about 0.35% of loans a year ($0.47 a share). This is a real, named risk. The loan book is concentrated in retail/restaurant, warehouse and hospitality properties across North Carolina, Virginia, South Carolina, West Virginia and Georgia, and a North Carolina warehouse relationship went into receivership in 2025. That leaves $0.83 a share, worth about $13.85, with no credit for excess capital because it would be needed to absorb losses. Bull case ($38.50): the second quarter of 2026 turns out to be the new normal. Net interest margin was 3.38% versus 2.82% for 2025, and adjusted profit was $11.6 million for the quarter. The drivers are already visible: the reinvested sale proceeds, the repositioned bond portfolio, and deposit costs falling as higher-rate CDs mature (cost of interest-bearing deposits fell from 2.91% in 2024 to 2.69% in 2025). With credit losses at the 2019-2025 average, that is about $2.18 a share, worth about $36.35, plus the same $2.15 of excess capital. Debt: as a bank, deposits and borrowings are its raw material, so we value earnings after interest and do not subtract them separately. At June 30, 2026 it had no Federal Home Loan Bank advances, $10.8 million of other borrowings and $105 million of unused credit lines, so the parent company has no maturity that threatens shareholders. In the bear case, leverage shows up as credit losses eating into capital. What would make this wrong: a larger wave of commercial real estate losses than the bear case assumes. On the upside, the post-sale margin holding for several more quarters would move fair value toward the bull case. Nonperforming assets fell to $40.9 million (1.09% of assets) after the loan sale, against an allowance of $55.2 million (1.48% of loans). Margin-of-safety price: $15.50, about 38% below the base case and modestly above the bear case. That reflects a low-return, commercial-real-estate-heavy bank whose normal earnings after the Justice resolution have only one clean quarter of evidence so far.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $1.38 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$39,862K; dWC (other assets +$1,859K, other liabilities -$2,329K, net loans held-for-sale -$182K) = -$652K, removed; SBC=$2,071K; capex=$8,055K, growth capex=4.34% x revenue increase $11,529K = $500K so maintenance capex=$7,555K; OE=$30,888K; diluted shares=22,456,705; OE/sh=$1.375. Reconciles exactly to NI $31,362K + non-cash items (provision -$3,831K, D&A $7,859K, deferred tax $2,171K, securities amortization $3,172K, other) less SBC. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001829576-26-000018.
2024 $1.09 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$36,938K; dWC (other assets +$1,614K, other liabilities +$1,687K, net loans held-for-sale +$138K) = +$3,439K, removed; SBC=$1,752K; capex=$8,133K, growth capex=4.34% x revenue increase $28,399K = $1,232K so maintenance capex=$6,901K; OE=$24,846K; diluted shares=22,817,149; OE/sh=$1.089. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001829576-26-000018.
2023 $1.58 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$46,730K; dWC (other assets -$3,849K, other liabilities +$3,803K, net loans held-for-sale +$109K) = +$63K, removed; SBC=$1,561K; capex=$9,798K, growth capex=4.34% x revenue increase $32,798K = $1,423K so maintenance capex=$8,375K; OE=$36,731K; diluted shares=23,240,543; OE/sh=$1.580. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001829576-26-000018.
2022 $2.51 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$70,791K; dWC (other assets -$2,914K, other liabilities +$3,549K, net loans held-for-sale +$2,137K) = +$2,772K, removed; SBC=$1,314K; capex=$5,890K, growth capex=4.34% x revenue increase $19,122K = $830K so maintenance capex=$5,060K; OE=$61,645K; diluted shares=24,595,789; OE/sh=$2.506. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0001829576-25-000016 (latest restated).
2021 $1.35 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$77,538K; dWC (other assets +$8,592K, other liabilities -$1,601K, net loans held-for-sale +$25,574K) = +$32,565K, removed; SBC=$1,040K; capex=$8,484K, growth capex=$0 (revenue declined) so maintenance capex=$8,484K; OE=$35,449K; diluted shares=26,342,729; OE/sh=$1.346. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001829576-24-000016 (latest restated).
2020 $1.00 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$7,704K; dWC (other assets -$18,723K, other liabilities -$5,716K, net loans held-for-sale -$5,461K) = -$29,900K, removed; SBC=$1,016K; capex=$10,120K, growth capex=$0 (revenue declined, capex/revenue mean 4.34% 2019-2025) so maintenance capex=$10,120K; OE=$26,468K; diluted shares=26,379,774; OE/sh=$1.003. Net loss of $45.9M reflects $62.2M non-cash goodwill impairment, added back via CFO. Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0001829576-23-000009 (latest restated).
2019 $1.30 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$38,286K; dWC (cash effect of other assets +$10,094K, other liabilities +$2,231K, net loans held-for-sale originations/proceeds -$17,041K) = -$4,716K, removed; SBC=$381K; capex=$8,453K, growth capex=$0 (no prior-year revenue on file) so maintenance capex=$8,453K; OE=$34,168K; diluted shares=26,258,576; OE/sh=$1.301. Loan-loss provisions are added back by CFO (credit cost handled in valuation). Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001829576-22-000013.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States - South: Virginia (51 branches) and North Carolina (13 branches), with commercial real estate lending exposure also in South Carolina, West Virginia and Georgia.
Historical growth strategy

We don't have historical growth strategy information for this company yet.

Chart analysis
Over the past year the shares roughly doubled, from a 52-week low of about $16.78 to a high of about $36.06, with the move accelerating after the bank sold its largest problem loan relationship in March 2026. By early August 2026 the stock sat near $33 after a few weeks of modest declines. A chartist would call this a strong uptrend now consolidating just below resistance in the mid-$30s, with nearby support around $31 and deeper support in the high $20s; short-term moving-average signals had turned negative, so the question is whether the pullback holds above the old breakout area.
Competitors

We don't have competitor information for this company yet.

Circle of competence

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