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Aurora Innovation, Inc. (AUR) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$0.30 ComplexityHigh Updated
$0.00 $0.59
bear $0.00 base $0.00 bull $0.59 margin of safety $0.30 market price* $4.86
Business condition attached to the margin of safety At least four consecutive quarters in which operating cash flow less capital spending and stock-based pay is at or near break-even, funded by contracted driverless freight revenue rather than new share sales.
Aurora Innovation develops the Aurora Driver, self-driving software and hardware for heavy trucks, and sells it as a subscription service to freight carriers. It began driverless commercial hauling in Texas in April 2025 with Hirschbach and Uber Freight, has run supervised pilots with FedEx, Schneider, Volvo Autonomous Solutions and Werner, and in 2026 announced deployment agreements with Value Truck and Charger Logistics and a plan to have 200 driverless trucks on the road by the end of 2026. Hardware for the next generation of the Driver is supplied by AUMOVIO (formerly Continental) under a partnership running to March 2031, paid per mile driven. Ride-hailing (with Toyota and Uber) and local delivery are later ambitions with no revenue. What the business earns today: revenue was $3 million in 2025 and $3 million in the first half of 2026. Against that, the cash the business actually consumes, measured the same way every year (operating cash flow, less stock compensation because it is a real cost paid in shares, less capital spending, with timing swings in working capital removed), has been a loss of $748 million in 2021, $716 million in 2022, $796 million in 2023, $764 million in 2024 and $858 million in 2025, or roughly $0.47 to $1.20 per share. The measurement window starts in 2021, when Aurora absorbed Uber's self-driving unit; the median year is a loss of about $764 million, or about $0.60 per share. The 2022 accounting loss of $1.7 billion included a $1.1 billion write-off of the goodwill from the Uber deal; that was a non-cash charge and was added back, so it does not distort these figures. Payments on office and facility leases were treated as an ongoing operating cost rather than a working-capital swing. All capital spending was treated as upkeep, because with almost no revenue there is no sensible way to separate growth spending; it is small ($31 million in 2025) and does not change the conclusion. Losses are widening, not narrowing: the 2025 loss was about 12% larger than 2024's, and the first half of 2026 burned $384 million of operating cash plus $56 million of equipment, a faster pace than any prior year. Balance sheet: at June 30, 2026 Aurora held $136 million of cash and $1,081 million of short-term investments, about $1.22 billion in total, with no borrowings and about $30 million of warrant liabilities. That is roughly $0.59 per share across 1,998 million shares outstanding. At the first-half 2026 spending rate this covers roughly 16 months. The company states it expects continued operating losses and will raise additional capital as needed; in 2025 it raised $898 million by selling about 151 million new shares. How the cases are built. Only cash flows that are contracted or that the business has already shown it can produce repeatedly are credited. Aurora has no disclosed backlog or contracted volumes, and the new deployment agreements and the 200-truck target are announcements without disclosed pricing or volume commitments. Even a generous assumption for revenue per truck on 200 trucks would cover only a small fraction of more than $900 million of yearly spending. Growth into new freight lanes, California, ride-hailing or delivery depends on things that have not yet happened, so none of it is credited in any case. Because there is no debt, there are no interest payments to add back and nothing to subtract other than the small warrant liability. Bear case, $0.00 per share: spending continues at the first-half 2026 pace of close to $900 million a year, today's $1.22 billion is used up by late 2027, and further development is funded by issuing new shares. Today's cash is consumed by losses and nothing that can be evidenced today is left for existing holders. The business is worth nothing on today's evidence, it owes no debt, and shareholders are left with approximately nothing. Liabilities are small, so the shares are not worth less than zero. Base case, $0.00 per share: the same story at the 2023 to 2025 spending level of roughly $760 to $860 million a year. Revenue from the Texas driverless lanes grows but, on anything that can be evidenced, stays far below costs through the period the cash lasts. The cash is spent before the business produces a dollar of owner earnings, so its value to today's shareholders is effectively zero. The business is worth nothing on evidenced cash flows, it has no debt, and the difference is about zero. Bull case, $0.59 per share: the company's own levers work as planned: the second-generation hardware kit at roughly half the previous cost, AUMOVIO's per-mile hardware from 2027, and the driverless fleet ramp. In this case the self-driving program ends up returning roughly what it costs over its life, so the operating business is worth about nothing on its own and shareholders keep the value of today's balance sheet: $1,217 million of cash and investments less the $30 million warrant liability, divided by 1,998 million shares. No profit beyond break-even is credited, because no contracted volumes or proven unit economics exist to support one. What would make this wrong: disclosed, contracted driverless volumes at prices that cover the per-truck cost of service, or several consecutive quarters of operating cash flow improving toward break-even without new share sales. Either would give the business a value of its own that these cases do not include. In the other direction, stock-based pay (about $188 million in 2025) and repeated share sales steadily reduce each existing share's claim on whatever value eventually emerges. Margin-of-safety price: at no positive price do the evidenced cases protect against permanent loss, because both the bear and base cases are worth about nothing. The margin-of-safety price of $0.30 applies only if the business first shows it can stop consuming its cash (see the condition below); it sits about half below the cash per share to allow for the uncertainty that remains even then.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 -$0.47 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(581)M; dWC (other assets -9, other liabilities +67; operating lease liability payments $(29)M kept in OE)=$58M; SBC=$188M; capex=$31M, all treated as maintenance (revenue $3M vs nil, capex/revenue ratio not meaningful); OE=$(858)M; diluted shares=1,839M; OE/sh=$(0.4666). Reconciliation: NI (816)+D&A 30+ROU 28-deriv FV 29-accretion 11-lease pmts 29-capex 31=(858), matches. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001828108-26-000016.
2024 -$0.47 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(611)M; dWC (other assets -22, other liabilities -3; operating lease liability payments $(26)M kept in OE)=$(25)M; SBC=$144M; capex=$34M, all maintenance (revenue nil); OE=$(764)M; diluted shares=1,618M; OE/sh=$(0.4722). Reconciliation: NI (748)+D&A 21+ROU 28+deriv FV 24-accretion 28-other 1-lease pmts 26-capex 34=(764), matches. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001828108-26-000016.
2023 -$0.60 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(598)M; dWC (other assets +1, other liabilities +22; operating lease liability payments $(25)M kept in OE)=$23M; SBC=$160M; capex=$15M, all maintenance (revenue nil); OE=$(796)M; diluted shares=1,327M; OE/sh=$(0.5998). Reconciliation: NI (796)+D&A 21+ROU 27+deriv FV 20-accretion 28-lease pmts 25-capex 15=(796), matches. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001828108-26-000016.
2022 -$0.63 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(508)M; dWC (other assets +47, other liabilities -10; operating lease liability payments $(25)M kept in OE)=$37M; SBC=$156M; capex=$15M, growth capex=$0 (revenue declined 82->68) so maintenance capex=$15M; OE=$(716)M; diluted shares=1,143M; OE/sh=$(0.6264). Reconciliation: NI (1,723)+D&A 22+ROU 28+goodwill impairment 1,114 (Uber ATG, non-cash, added back)-deriv FV 114-other 3-lease pmts 25-capex 15=(716), matches. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001828108-24-000028.
2021 -$1.20 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(564)M (restated); dWC (other current/non-current assets -48, other liabilities -36; operating lease liability payments $(21)M kept in OE as an operating cost)=$(84)M; SBC=$220M; capex=$48M, all treated as maintenance (revenue is collaboration revenue from Toyota, capex/revenue ratio not meaningful); OE=$(748)M; diluted shares=621M; OE/sh=$(1.2045). Reconciliation: NI (755)+D&A 16+ROU 25+deriv FV 20+non-cash severance 8-deferred tax 5+other 12-lease pmts 21-capex 48=(748), matches. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0001828108-24-000028.
2020 -$0.76 ▼
OE = CFO - dWC - SBC - maintenance capex. CFO=$(191.879)M; dWC (prepaids -11.692, other assets -14.038, AP +2.189, accrued +13.674; operating lease liability payments of $(1.526)M kept in OE as an operating cost)=$(9.867)M; SBC=$16.880M; capex=$6.689M, all treated as maintenance (revenue nil, capex/revenue ratio undefined); OE=$(205.581)M; diluted shares=270.940M; OE/sh=$(0.7588). Reconciliation: NI (214.449)+D&A 3.117+ROU 14.109-accretion 0.143-lease pmts 1.526-capex 6.689=(205.581), matches. Pre-Uber ATG acquisition business. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0001628280-22-005886.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography
United States - South (Texas); essentially all current driverless freight revenue is booked on Texas lanes.
Historical growth strategy

We don't have historical growth strategy information for this company yet.

Chart analysis
Closed at $6.04 on September 25, 2026, inside a wide 52-week range of $3.60 to $8.57. A chartist would read this as a volatile, range-bound stock: roughly two-thirds above its 52-week low but about 30% below its high, with no established trend in either direction. The $3.60 low marks support and the $8.57 high marks overhead resistance; the company's own share sales in 2025 at an average of about $5.96 (and about $4.42 in the fourth quarter) fall in the $4 to $6 zone, which a chartist might treat as a supply area. The wide range points to momentum- and news-driven trading rather than a steady trend.
Competitors

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Circle of competence

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