valueequityanalysis.com

Independent, business-by-business valuations built from company filings — owner earnings, a ten-year outlook, and a bear / base / bull range. Search a ticker to see our estimate of what the business is worth.

Not investment advice. We are not registered investment advisers, and the people behind this site may hold or trade positions in companies analyzed here. Full disclosures.

AUTOLIV INC (ALV) stock intrinsic value fair value estimate & owner earnings analysis

Margin of safety$56.00 Updated
$27.00 $158.00
bear $27.00 base $93.00 bull $158.00 margin of safety $56.00 market price* $115.99
Business condition attached to the margin of safety At least one additional fiscal year (beyond 2025) confirming owner earnings per share sustained above roughly $5, showing the 2024-2025 improvement in working-capital discipline and capex efficiency is durable rather than a one-time release.
Autoliv is the world's largest maker of automotive passive-safety systems - airbags, seatbelts and steering wheels - sold to essentially every major global auto manufacturer. In 2018 the company spun off its electronics and driver-assistance business (Veoneer) and kept only passive safety; because that spin-off changed what kind of business this is, we built our earnings history only from 2019 forward. The business is straightforward but not gentle: revenue tracks global vehicle production plus growth in 'safety content per vehicle' as regulators keep requiring more airbags and better protection, but every OEM contract carries built-in annual price reductions that Autoliv has to out-engineer every year just to hold margin. The top five customers are about 44% of sales and the top ten about 70%, though no single contract is more than about 2% of sales - so customer risk is diffuse rather than concentrated in one relationship, but it does mean this is genuinely a cyclical, capital- and working-capital-intensive supplier business, not a steady annuity. That cyclicality shows up clearly in cash generation: the cash actually available to owners, after funding the working capital and equipment investment the business needs just to keep running, ranged from about $1.13 per share in 2022 (a year of heavy inventory build during the chip shortage) to about $9.52 per share in 2025 (a year that benefited from working capital actually turning into a source of cash). We used the middle of that seven-year range, about $3.49 per share, as the normalized starting point for our valuation - not the most recent, best year, because a single great year is not the level the business reliably earns. Looking forward, we expect earnings to grow only modestly faster than global vehicle production, reflecting steady but unspectacular content-per-vehicle growth net of the price give-backs built into the contracts. Because airbags and seatbelts are required in a vehicle regardless of whether it runs on gasoline or electricity, we don't think this business faces the same technology-obsolescence risk that pure powertrain or electronics suppliers do, so we've valued it as an ongoing business rather than a melting ice cube, with modest sustained growth beyond our ten-year forecast. That said, more than half of our estimated value in every case comes from what the business earns beyond that ten-year horizon, so the valuation leans heavily on our view that passive-safety demand for every vehicle sold persists indefinitely - which is a reasonable view for airbags, but not one we hold with certainty for any business ten years out, and we want to be upfront about it. Our bear case assumes the tougher parts of the last cycle - price pressure, tariff-related cost that isn't fully recoverable from customers, and heavy working-capital and equipment spending - become closer to the norm rather than the exception, without the 2024-2025 improvement proving durable; on that path the shares are worth roughly $27. Our base case assumes the business settles into something like its historical average economics with slow, steady growth, worth roughly $93. Our bull case assumes the 2024-2025 improvement in cash conversion holds and safety-content growth outpaces price pressure, worth roughly $158. One accounting note: Autoliv doesn't break out stock-based compensation as its own line in the cash flow statement - it's folded into a broader 'other, net' adjustment. We found the actual figure in the footnotes (about $20 million in 2025, small relative to the size of the business) and subtracted it separately so it isn't silently left inside 'cash from operations.' Given the wide gap between our bear and base cases, a mechanical formula would call for a steep discount to our base-case value. We've moderated that somewhat: even in its worst recent year the business was solidly profitable and kept paying its dividend, which is not the profile of a truly speculative situation. The margin-of-safety price is in the mid-$50s per share; at least one more year of results confirming that the 2024-2025 improvement in cash generation is durable rather than a one-time working-capital release would strengthen confidence in the estimate.
Fiscal yearOwner's earningsMethodology
2025 $9.52 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$1,157.0M; ΔWC=$(13)M (receivables −$98M, other operating assets −$26M, inventories −$8M, AP +$119M, accrued expenses −$30M, income taxes +$30M); SBC=$20M (disclosed RSU/PSU expense; not broken out on the face of the cash-flow statement, folded into 'Other, net' of $44M along with pension/other non-cash items); capex=$441.0M, revenue rose to $10,815.0M from $10,390.0M (2024) — capex_ratio 5.37% × $425M = $22.8M growth capex, maintenance capex=$441.0−$22.8=$418.2M; OE=$1,157.0+$13−$20−$418.2=$731.8M; diluted shares=76.9M; OE/sh=$9.52. Reconciliation check: NI $736M + D&A $407M + other non-cash (net of gain on divestiture/deferred taxes) $425M − maintenance capex $418.2M = $749.8M vs OE-from-CFO $731.8M, a 2.5% gap, within tolerance. Source: FY2025 10-K, accession 0001193125-26-058162.
2024 $5.11 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$1,059.0M; ΔWC=$53M (receivables +$47M, other operating assets +$67M, inventories +$28M, AP −$83M, accrued expenses −$12M, income taxes +$6M); SBC=$16M; capex=$579.0M, revenue fell slightly to $10,390.0M from $10,475.0M (2023) so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$579.0M (full capex, declining-revenue rule); OE=$1,059.0−$53−$16−$579.0=$411.0M; diluted shares=80.4M; OE/sh=$5.11. Source: FY2024 10-K, accession 0000950170-25-023852.
2023 $2.92 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$982.0M; ΔWC=$234M (receivables −$221M, other operating assets +$7M, inventories −$22M, AP +$255M, accrued expenses +$172M, income taxes +$43M — continued inventory/receivable build against strong order growth, funded by payables/accruals); SBC=$14M; capex=$573.0M, revenue rose to $10,475.0M from $8,842.0M (2022) — capex_ratio 5.37% × $1,633M = $87.7M growth capex, maintenance capex=$573.0−$87.7=$485.3M; OE=$982.0−$234−$14−$485.3=$248.7M; diluted shares=85.2M; OE/sh=$2.92. Source: FY2023 10-K, accession 0000950170-24-016787.
2022 $1.13 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$713.0M; ΔWC=$58M (receivables −$297M, inventories −$243M, AP/accrued +$596M, income taxes +$2M — heavy inventory/receivable build amid chip-shortage safety-stocking, largely funded by an AP build); SBC=$4M; capex=$585.0M, revenue rose to $8,842.0M from $8,230.0M (2021) — capex_ratio 5.37% × $612M = $32.9M growth capex, maintenance capex=$585.0−$32.9=$552.1M; OE=$713.0−$58−$4−$552.1=$98.9M; diluted shares=87.2M; OE/sh=$1.13. This is the trough year in the anchor window: heavy working-capital investment plus a high capex ratio compressed owner earnings well below GAAP EPS ($4.85). Source: FY2022 10-K, accession 0000950170-23-002977.
2021 $4.45 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$754.0M; ΔWC=$(62)M (receivables +$283M, inventories −$19M, AP/accrued −$314M, income taxes −$12M — semiconductor-shortage-driven volatility); SBC=$10M; capex=$458.0M, revenue rose to $8,230.0M from $7,447.0M (2020) — capex_ratio (mean 2019-2025)=5.37% × $783M revenue increase = $42.0M growth capex, maintenance capex=$458.0−$42.0=$416.0M; OE=$754.0+$62−$10−$416.0=$390.0M; diluted shares=87.7M; OE/sh=$4.45. Source: FY2021 10-K, accession 0000950170-22-001528.
2020 $2.47 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$849.0M; ΔWC=$277M (receivables −$415M, inventories −$34M, AP/accrued +$672M, income taxes +$54M — COVID-year cash release from inventory/receivable drawdown followed by a sharp AP build as production restarted); SBC=$12M; capex=$344.0M, revenue fell to $7,447.0M from $8,547.6M in 2019 so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$344.0M; OE=$849.0−$277−$12−$344.0=$216.0M; diluted shares=87.5M; OE/sh=$2.47. Source: FY2020 10-K, accession 0001564590-21-006803.
2019 $3.49 ▼
OE = CFO − ΔWC − SBC − maintenance capex. CFO=$640.7M; ΔWC=$(155.8)M (receivables +$25.4M, inventories +$15.4M, AP/accrued +$35.7M, income taxes $(29.3)M, and a one-off $(203.0)M EC antitrust legal settlement payment against a liability accrued in 2018 — the EC matter is a genuine cash cost, not stripped out); SBC=$8.4M; capex=$483.4M, capex_ratio (mean capex/revenue, 2019-2025 window)=5.37%, revenue declined vs. 2018 ($8,547.6M vs $8,678.2M) so growth capex=$0 and maintenance capex=$483.4M; OE=$640.7+$155.8-$8.4-$483.4=$304.7M; diluted shares=87.4M; OE/sh=$3.49. Source: FY2019 10-K, accession 0001564590-20-005667.

Owner's earnings per share by fiscal year, most recent first. Tap a row to see how that figure was calculated, including the source filing.

Sales geography

We don't have sales geography information for this company yet.

Historical growth strategy

We don't have historical growth strategy information for this company yet.

Chart analysis

We don't have chart analysis for this company yet.

Competitors

We don't have competitor information for this company yet.

Circle of competence

We don't have circle of competence information for this company yet.